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MAKING SENSE OF 'PUBLIC' EMERGENCIES 
Frarn;ois Tanguay-Renaud• 
Emergencies are situations, often unforeseen, in which there is a risk of 
significant harm and a need to act urgently if the harm is to be averted or 
minimised. We encounter emergencies throughout our lives, and often 
allow them to shape our behaviour. Who has never sought to account for 
resorting to an unusual degree of force, failing to fulfill a promise, 
crossing a red light, or for any other sort of prima facie wrong doing by 
citing an emergency? Some theorists and policy-makers believe that there 
exists a special category of emergencies that pose distinctly greater 
challenges than others, and merit an independent focus. They tend to 
single them out as 'public emergencies.' 
Given the widespread and sometimes inconsistent uses of the 
category, I first ask in this article whether there really are emergencies that 
are so distinctive as to warrant resort to a specific 'public' designation. I 
argue that there are distinctively 'public' emergencies and that the label, 
although vague, helps bring out important contrasts. By virtue of their role 
and position in the world, governments must often contend with additional 
moral considerations that do not apply to ordinary agents, or do not apply 
in the same ways. Thus, whenever a government is responsible for 
handling an emergency, additional considerations come into play and 
affect the justifiability of what it might do in response. 'Public 
emergencies,' I shall argue, are emergencies that interfere with a 
government's performance of its role(s). As a result, such emergencies 
may have distinctive moral implications. That being said, my purpose in 
this article goes beyond mere definitional aims. I also want to demystify 
some popular and theoretical (mis)conceptions about public emergencies. 
Most notably, I want to confront and disentangle a number of conflicting 
claims that morality may be more demanding, relaxed, or altogether 
different in relation to public emergencies. While so doing, I want to 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This is the 
penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Philosophy of Management (fom1erly Reason 
in Practice). I wish to thank Kimberley Brownlee, Alon Harel, Elizabeth Angell, Rahul 
Rao, and, most importantly, John Gardner for discussion, comments, and criticism. 
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emphasise the heterogeneity of the category, and argue that different 
public emergencies may have widely differing characteristics and 
implications. Although the writings of moral and political theorists Tom 
Sorell and Michael Walzer constitute my principal foil in the article, I 
address the works of various other commentators along the way. I 
conclude with a few remarks on the importance of formal declarations to 
the justifiability of some governmental responses to public emergencies. 
These considerations set the stage for further study of the relationship 
between public emergencies and the rule of law as an ethic of governance. 
I. THE 'PUBLIC' CHARACTER OF EMERGENCIES: A 
FEW NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
Can an independent inquiry into the idea of 'public emergencies' teach us 
anything important about emergencies? Before entering the thick of the 
argument, I believe that a few methodological caveats about the use of the 
label 'public' are in order. First, it is important to note that the label can be 
misleading. According to the Oxford English D;ctionmy, the word may 
qualify that which 'belongs to, affects, or concerns the community or 
nation.' 1 In this sense, academic and policy designations of wide-scale or 
collectively-threatening emergencies as 'public' seem at least minimally 
fitting. Yet, as the editors of the OED are keen to add in a caveat: 'The 
varieties of sense [of the word 'public'] are numerous and pass into each 
other by many intermediate shades of meaning. The exact shade often 
depends upon the substantive qualified, and in some expressions more 
than one sense is vaguely present'. In other words, the public-private 
distinction is notoriously multifaceted. Depending on the purpose for 
which it is used, it may reveal different aspects of reality while masking 
others: state/non-state, public good or private property, private home and 
public street, and so forth. The designation of an emergency as 'public' 
does not escape the complexity and confusion inherent in the distinction. 
For example, on the basis of the definition introduced at the beginning of 
this paragraph, even a discrete individual emergency could meet the 
1 
'public, a. (n.)' in Oxford English Dictionary Online 2nd ed Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 1989, online: <http://dictionary.oed. 
corn/ cgi/findword? query_ type=word&que1yword=public>. 
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'public' threshold, to the extent that it is a kind of emergency that should 
concern not just the affected individuals but their fellow-citizens-
consider murderous assaults or rape attempts. 
If significant emergencies involve a risk of serious harm, and 
serious harm is by and large a proper matter of public concern, then a 
fairly wide assortment of significant emergencies may be said to be public. 
Admittedly, limits such as those set by the 'harm principle' may be 
invoked to restrict the legitimate scope of public concern. Depending on 
how these limits are articulated, the range of public emergencies properly 
called as such may vary. 2 Yet more often than not, commentators who 
invoke the label 'public emergency' are not considering discrete individual 
emergencies. They speak instead of emergencies that are so significant as 
to constitute potential justifications for emergency measures, states of 
emergency, martial law, and the like. They want to talk about emergencies 
that governments, law, and sometimes even morality, may not be able to 
address in a normal manner, if at all. Therefore, their analyses tend to 
distinguish between relatively isolated individual emergencies and what 
they term 'public emergencies.' For example, Tom Sorell writes that: 
There are imp01iant differences between, on the one hand, public 
emergencies-emergencies facing whole states or large number of 
people, and which are usually the responsibility of public agencies 
and their officials-and, on the other hand, emergencies 
confronting individuals in a private capacity.3 
Sorell then goes on to focus on 'the more extreme' and 'general' 
emergencies-his examples include a 'state of all-out war' and of a 
'violent civil war involving genocide'4-as paradigmatic public 
emergencies against which we should contrast private emergencies.5 
Sorell's tendency to assimilate public emergencies with worst-case 
scenarios may be explained by his ultimate aim, which is to provide an 
2 Compare the various positions smveyed in John Stanton-Ife 'The Limits of Law' in: E. 
Zalta (ed) The Stm!ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), online: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/ entries/law-limits/>. 
3 Tom Sorell 'Morality and Emergency' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 
(2002) pp 21-37 at p 22. 
4 Sorell (2002, pp 27, 31). 
5 Sorell (2002, pp 26-27, 31-33, 36-37). 
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account of the defensibility of exceptional powers that governments 
sometimes employ to deal with especially severe emergencies. The move 
is relatively unsurprising, given the common tendency to assume that 
exceptional powers of this sort are most relevant in cases of emergencies 
that pose grave threats to law, order, social norms and state institutions, 
not to mention collective and moral survival. Yet, such a broad-brush use 
of the public-private distinction threatens to obscure more subtle ways in 
which some emergencies may present greater, or different, challenges for 
state and law than those of discrete individual emergencies. Sorell's 
approach may also obscure a more nuanced assessment of the types of 
state powers and responses suitable to different types of emergencies. 
To be fair, Sorell is not oblivious to such subtleties. For example, 
he affirms that 'it makes a difference what is in the balance. The foot and 
mouth emergency is not to be compared to the Second World War, and the 
analogy between September 11 and Pearl Harbour is very strained in many 
ways as well. ' 6 Notice some of the various distinctions at play in this 
sentence. One of the central differences between the 2001 British foot-
and-mouth emergency and the Second World War is quantitative-
irrespective of any other contrasts the Second World War affected people 
on a much wider scale, and put many more lives at stake. The attacks of 
September 11 and Pearl Harbour cannot be so easily distinguished. Similar 
numbers of people were killed and wounded, and the scope of the material 
destruction was comparable in many ways. If a difference exists, it seems 
to be much a qualitative one-for example, one attack included a civilian 
target and was perpetrated by non-state actors, whereas the other was 
aimed at a military base and was the act of a state. Upon close reading, 
Sorell alludes to conceptual tools that could help make sense of these basic 
distinctions. On the one hand, he repeatedly stresses the relationship 
between considerations of scale and the 'public' character of 
emergencies.7 On the other, he emphasises that some emergencies 
endanger matters that are already the inherent responsibility of 
governmental agencies. For example, he argues that, even if there is no 
'human disaster' involved, it seems legitimate for a government to take 
necessary steps to ensure a country's survival.8 'It even seems legitimate,' 
6 Sorell (2002, p 35). 
7 Sorell (2002, p 22, 26-27, 31, 35). 
8 Sorell (2002, p 36-37). 
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he adds, 'for the desirability of national survival to go without saying for 
the corresponding national governments.' According to him, 'There are 
attachments, like that of a government to a nation[ ... ] which confer special 
responsibility'. 
Unfortunately, Sorell fails to differentiate and delineate these 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions and systematically discuss their 
ramifications. Instead, he tends to conflate them. Remember that, 
according to him, public emergencies are 'emergencies facing whole states 
or large number of people, and which are usually the responsibility of 
public agencies and their officials. ' 9 As I suggested above, this approach 
obscures important nuances. It is true that some emergencies may be both 
large-in-scale and the inherent responsibility of governmental agencies 
and their officials. It might even be true that such emergencies place 
unique demands on the polity. However, since these dimensions do not 
necessarily go hand-in-hand in a given emergency, it seems 
methodologically sounder to distinguish them. 
A few more preliminary remarks are in order. As I already 
mentioned, one of the main reasons for my interest in 'public 
emergencies' is the abundance of theoretical and political claims that some 
such emergencies warrant drastic and unusual responses from 
governments and their representatives. Yet cautionary tales are almost as 
abundant. For example, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, who focus 
on violent emergencies threatening state governance, suggest that: 
The vast scope of powers [conferred on or invoked by 
governments in some public emergencies] and their ability to 
interfere with fundamental individual rights and civil liberties and 
to allow governmental regulation of virtually all aspects of human 
activity-as well as the possibility of their abuse-emphasize the 
pressing need for clearly defining the situations in which they may 
be invoked. 10 
9 Sorell (2002, p 22) [Emphasis added]. 
10 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in 
The01J1 and Practice Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006, pp 5-6. 
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Paradoxically, Gross and Ni Aolain state their doubt that precise 
definitions can ever exist. Admittedly, when discussed in abstracto, the 
contours of emergencies that might justify different responses will 
unavoidably be somewhat vague. However, I believe that, once fleshed 
out, quantitative and qualitative parameters unveiled by a close reading of 
Sorell's work may well reveal themselves as key grounds for assessing the 
propriety of various governmental responses. 
For the sake of clarity, let me emphasise that the law often insists 
on the fulfilment of very specific criteria before a given 'emergency 
measure' can be imposed. For example, Canada's Emergencies Act, 1988, 
reserves the most draconian powers for what it deems to be the most 
serious emergencies and authorises more limited measures for less serious 
emergencies. At one extreme, the existence of a 'war emergency' (s 37) 
grants the federal government a wide margin of discretion to make orders 
or regulations that it 'believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary or 
advisable for the dealing with the emergency' (s 40). At the other end of 
the spectrum, a 'public welfare emergency' (s 5) caused by a large-scale 
natural catastrophe, a pandemic, or an industrial accident, allows for a 
relatively limited set of listed measures that must be closely tailored to the 
nature of that emergency (s 8). So-called 'public order emergencies' and 
'international emergencies,' which pose more serious, or differently 
challenging, threats to the integrity of the Canadian state, its legal system, 
and its normal provision of government, occupy a middle position and 
allow for a number of more invasive and unusual measures (ss 19 and 30). 
Note that legally-stated criteria for emergencies and the precise nature of 
the powers and measures made possible by the fulfilment of these criteria 
may conceivably be spelt out in even finer detail. 11 They may also be left 
more broadly open, as in the case of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which allows for derogations from many Convention rights in time 
of 'war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.' 12 
Such technical variations can be explained by the fact that the law, when it 
borrows a moral concept like 'emergency,' may adjust or restrict its 
II For example, the Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984 (Commonwealth of Australia) deals 
specifically with emergencies related to the shortage, or likelihood of shortage, of liquid 
petroleum, a liquid petroleum product, a liquid petrochemical, methanol or ethanol. 
Iz Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) s 15(1). 
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meaning to suit its va1ious purposes. However, this modus operandi 
should not cause us to forget that responses to emergencies, legal or 
otherwise, are ultimately answerable to morality. Legal definitions, like 
other governmental claims, do not have the final word. The ultimate 
grounds for assessing responses to emergencies are the characteristics of 
these emergencies as they actually unfold in the world, in all their 
complexities. 
Therefore, prior to any investigation of what actual legal systems 
say about emergencies, one must reflect upon what may cause some of 
them to possess different, or greater, moral implications than others. This 
is precisely what I intend to do in the sections ahead. While doing so, I 
will strive to provide a more consistent, transparent, and, hopefully, useful 
account of why and how the idea of 'publicness' may matter-an account 
that is more explicit and nuanced than Sorell's, and perhaps less of a 
hostage to the kind of responses whose defensibility it might serve to 
appraise. 
II. PUBLIC EMERGENCIES AND THE MORAL POSITION 
OF GOVERNMENTS 
A. GOVERNMENTS AS MORAL AGENTS 
A sound understanding of why some emergencies may pose more radical, 
or different, challenges than others to governments and law begins with 
the realisation that governments are moral agents, and therefore have 
moral responsibilities. Here, I follow Joseph Raz in distinguishing 'the 
state, which is the political organization of society, its government, the 
agent through which it acts, and the law, the vehicle through which much 
of its power is exercised.' 13 Given the deep interconnections between these 
notions, they are often used interchangeably. For example, legal and 
political theory literature sometimes refers perfectly intelligibly to states as 
moral agents. At times, I have myself been venially guilty of crisscrossing 
13 Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom Oxford, Oxford University Press 1986, p 70. 
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the distinctions suggested by Raz. However, to the extent that a more 
rigorous approach may clarify my argument and allow for key distinctions, 
I will endeavour to respect them. 
Now, I do recognise that an understanding of governments as 
moral agents is controversial. It is often argued that governments are 
fictional entities, and that fictional entities are not agents. Actions can 
perhaps be intelligibly imputed to fictions, the argument goes, but fictions 
cannot act per se. While this article is not the place for a full-blown 
metaphysical inquiry into the possibility of governmental agency, some 
limited observations are nonetheless apposite. First, those who raise the 
fiction objection tend to forget that, at least in principle, a human being 
may govern a society all by herself. Louis XIV may have been 
exaggerating when he (allegedly) replied 'L 'Etat, c'est moil' to those who 
advocated national representative institutions and a separation of powers. 
Yet, such a claim may not have seemed so fanciful if made by Orwell's 
Big Brother, Chaplin's Great Dictator, or Lon Fuller's Rex. It might even 
be harder to write off if voiced by the hands-on, all-powerful ruler of a 
minute, sparsely populated island state. If living human beings are not 
fictions and may be agents, and if, at least in principle, they can govern 
alone, must not those who claim that governments can never be agents be 
wrong? 
Perhaps the fiction objection has more bite against our big and 
multifaceted modern governments. After all, it is true that modem 
governments tend to be institutionalised and multilayered, to manage 
highly populated, territorially significant welfare states, and to depend for 
so doing on the actions of countless politicians, civil servants, and 
otherwise enlisted individuals. Given such features, is it not misleading to 
refer to these governments as agents? As recent theoretical literature 
points out, the elaborate corporate nature of modern governments does not 
prevent genuine governmental agency. 14 All governments have a complex 
normative framework-i.e. a constitution, written or unwritten-that 
constitutes and divides labour between their various organs, lays out 
principles of governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making and 
14 See especially Philip Pettit 'Responsibility Incorporated' Ethics 117 (2007) pp 171-
201; Alexander Wendt Social The01y of International Politics Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1999, pp 193-245. 
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control mechanisms. By complying with this framework to a reasonable 
extent (insofar as it provides for sufficient constraints against internal 
inconsistencies), individual members allow their government qua 
corporate entity to form judgments and exhibit attitudes as a coherent 
whole, and to make reasonably consistent decisions on the evaluative 
propositions that they present to it for consideration. Thus, governments 
can arrange for things to be done, and be held responsible for them. This is 
the assumption on which I will proceed, not only because I find it 
persuasive, but because treating governments as moral agents provides an 
unparalleled lens through which one can make sense of what it means, 
generally speaking, to speak of some emergencies as 'public.' 
B. CONTINGENTLY OR INHERENTLY PUBLIC EMERGENCIES? 
1. CONTINGENTLY PUBLIC EMERGENCIES? 
When confronted with an emergency, a government may be in a 
distinctive moral position for a number of contingent and inherent reasons. 
The contingent reasons include, though are not limited to, what Sorell 
terms considerations of scale. When emergencies are large-in-scale, 
governments and their officials are often better, and sometimes even 
uniquely, situated to address them. Typically, governments have means 
and resources that are unavailable to individuals or small groups, such as 
extensive de facto authority, significant control over the use of force, 
considerable economic power, and relevant expertise. Thus, when the 
magnitude of an emergency makes it necessary, they tend to be able to 
coordinate more effectively, distribute resources more efficiently, react 
more forcefully, and fund and implement more accurate prediction and 
prevention strategies. Individuals and non-governmental groups can play a 
part in minimising emergency-related harm in such situations, emblematic 
government agencies like the military and emergency services are often 
able to create a much more efficient and significant impact. Conversely, 
discrete individual emergencies or emergencies of a relatively small scale 
are often best addressed by those in the predicament (or those who are 
close to it), especially when they arise unforeseeably. Thus, even when a 
government undertakes to protect personal homes against fire, it usually 
refrains from hiring specialised fire monitors to alert the fire department in 
case of emergency. As a general rule, this would be inefficient, if not 
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counter-productive, since ordinary citizens are usually best placed to fulfil 
this task. Consider also the case of the bystander who is the only person 
able to provide ready assistance to a man being mugged on the street. 
As intuitive as they may seem, these assessments of situational 
competence are merely contingent. For example, the government of a poor 
and weak state might not be in a position to tackle large-scale emergencies 
effectively. A government that is usually able to address such emergencies 
appropriately may also be unable to do so in a particular instance. When 
this is the case, it may be best (at least some of the time) for individuals 
and non-governmental groups to deal with the situation instead. Similarly, 
whereas some people may be best-placed to tackle certain types of 
individual emergencies on their own, others may not. So there are really 
two sets of issues that Sorell ambiguously subsumes under the lone 
heading of 'scale.' Of course, the characteristics of an emergency-its 
scale, but also its harm potential, urgency, complexity, and so forth-will 
generally determine the types of responses needed. However, the 
appropriateness of a needed response may itself be influenced by the 
capacity or competence of the potential responder( s). I will come back to 
the broader relevance of this last point in the following sections. For the 
moment, note only that one might choose to label as 'public' those 
emergencies to which governments are best able to respond. But I have 
serious doubts about the wisdom of using the label in such a contingent 
way. On the one hand, such use unnecessarily obscures the possibility that 
governmental and non-governmental agents may be equally well-situated 
to respond to an emergency, or that they may be able to play 
complementaiy roles. It also fails to account for another imp01iant sense in 
which we deem some emergencies to be 'public,' that is to say, when it is 
the government's inherent responsibility-or, some might prefer to say, its 
inherent duty-to tackle them. Could this second application of the label 
provide a sounder basis for classification? 
2. THE GENERAL DUTY OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
The last question invites an investigation of when, if ever, it is a 
government's duty-or obligation-to address an emergency. Having a 
duty means having a reason to do (or not to do) something that is not 
hostage to one's goals and is also a reason not to act for certain conflicting 
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reasons. It seems to me that, like all agents, governments have general 
moral duties related to emergency assistance and prevention. 
Consider, for example, the general duty to rescue that is often said 
to find its roots in the value of human solidarity. If such a duty exists, as I 
believe it does, it binds all moral agents. Although, strictly speaking, 
modem governments are not human agents (despite depending on their 
human members to act) and may not be able to act in solidarity qua 
humans, it still makes sense to claim that their duties find ultimate 
explanation in human values such as solidarity. This reasoning falls in line 
with the 'humanistic principle' that has been defined and defended by 
Joseph Raz as 'the claim that the explanation and justification of the 
goodness or badness of anything derives from its contribution, actual or 
possible, to human life and its quality.' 15 This principle serves as an 
important reminder that, although a government's worth is irreducible to 
the value of the particular individuals that comprise it, that worth still 
derives from its value for human beings. Governmental agency does not, 
or so I will assume, have a moral value prior to, and independent of, its 
value for humans-the opposite stance being rather reminiscent of fascist 
thought. 
Attempting to articulate the content of the general duty to rescue, 
T.M. Scanlon affirms that 'If you are presented with a situation in which 
you can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate 
someone's dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) 
sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.' 16 Scanlon claims that no 
one could reasonably disagree that moral agents have such a duty, and 
save for some extreme libertarians, theorists tend to agree with him. There 
are disagreements about the scope of the duty; for example, some merely 
speak of a duty that 'stops at the brink of danger,' 17 or of 'easy rescues and 
other acts of aid for persons in grave peril' that can be performed with 
'minimal risk, cost, and inconvenience.' 18 However, most theorists agree 
that one should be willing to face at least some danger, risk, cost, 
15 Raz (1986, pp 194ff). 
16 T.M. Scanlon Tflhat We Owe Each Other Cambridge, Belknap Press 2000, p 224. 
17 A.M. Honore 'Law, Morals and Rescue' in: James M. Ratcliffe (ed) The Good 
Samaritan and the Law pp 225-242 Gloucester, Peter Smith 1981, p 231. 
18 H.M. Malm 'Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype' Law and Philosophy 19 
(1999) pp 707-750 at p 707. 
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inconvenience, or sacrifice to rescue people in grave peril. Note that, in 
practice, the characteristics of possible rescuers will often influence the 
contours of their duty. For example, a rescue that would have a light or 
moderate cost if performed by a government could require a tremendous 
sacrifice from an ordinary human agent. Whereas a government may only 
have to sacrifice the temporary use of a few well-equipped coastguard 
boats to rescue a sailor caught in a storm, an ill-equipped windsurfer could 
lose her life. Therefore, following from the point made in the last section, 
we could argue that the scope of an agent's duty to provide emergency 
assistance varies according to capacity, competence, and other relevant 
characteristics. 
Yet we intuitively feel that governments should provide emergency 
assistance beyond the threshold of mere inconvenience or even moderate 
cost or sacrifice. We tend to think of governments as morally obligated to 
do more. For example, many consider that the American government 
owed it to the inhabitants of New Orleans to rescue them, by hook or by 
crook, from the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. 
After years of neglected maintenance of the levee system, inadequate 
public education regarding the risk and severity of hurricanes in the 
region, and inadequate planning and preparedness training across 
jurisdictional levels, there was a sense in which the government was partly 
responsible for causing the peril faced by its citizens. 19 Consequently, 
many would argue that it was morally required to go out of its way to 
minimise and remedy the ensuing harm. While I do not dispute that 
causing an emergency may sometimes give rise to duties, I think that the 
deeper assumption at work in the previous example is that the government 
was inherently responsible for the implementation of the preventive 
measures listed above. It was part of its job, or in common philosophical 
parlance, part of its role. Therefore, critics assume, the government had 
obligations above and beyond the generic and somewhat contingent 
demands of human solidarity. I believe these claims are valid. 
19 Some commentators even insisted on describing Hurricane Katrina as two major 
disasters, one natural and the other man-made. E.g. L.K. Comfort 'Fragility in Disaster 
Response: Hurricane Katrina, 29 August 2005' The Fon1111 3 (2005) Article I at p 5, 
online: <http://www.bepress.com/forum/vo13/iss3/a1il/>. Although hyperbolic, this 
description brings out starkly the significance of the government's responsibility. 
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3. OF ROLES, LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS, AND INHERENTLY PUBLIC 
EMERGENCIES 
Roles and morality 
13 
The general idea that roles may come with special duties that are less or 
not at all contingent on an agent's individual characteristics is fairly 
uncontroversial. Like H.L.A. Hart, I understand the notion of role 
expansively to include the moral position of those who make promises.20 
In modem societies, it is widely accepted that promisors acquire new 
duties, and that these duties may be emergency-related. For example, 
someone may promise to come to another's aid in certain perilous 
circumstances and, thus, be under a duty to do so even if the risks involved 
are high. People may also acquire more extensive duties to provide 
emergency assistance by joining a profession that involves more extensive 
responsibilities of this kind-consider the case of medical doctors, 
firefighters, police officers, and lifeguards. In the words of Tony Honore, 
'If the fireman, policeman, or life-saver risks life and limb to help the 
imperiled, he deserves and receives praise, because there is an element of 
self-sacrifice or even heroism in his conduct, though what he does is 
clearly his duty. ' 21 Honore even suggests that people, such as experienced 
mountaineers, who hold themselves out as ready to effect rescues may 
incur additional duties by virtue of their claims. Furthermore, it is often 
assumed that people may find themselves bound by more extensive duties 
associated with roles that they have not necessarily chosen, such as 
parenthood. Shouldn't parents sometimes have to risk their own safety for 
the safety of their children to a greater extent than other people? I do not 
dispute that the definition and specific moral implications of different 
roles may vary from one society or culture to another. Nor do I take issue 
with those who argue that the types of considerations that ground the more 
stringent duties associated with various roles may differ from one to the 
next. However, I believe that the idea that some roles involve more 
20 Hart writes that 'If two friends, out on a mountaineering expedition, agree that one 
shall look after the food and the other the maps, then the one is correctly said to be 
responsible for the food, and the other for the maps, and I would classify this as a case of 
role-responsibility.' H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy ofLaw Oxford, OUP Oxford 1968, p 212. 
21 Honore (1981, p 230). 
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stringent duties to provide emergency assistance-preventive, concurrent, 
or ex post facto-holds at least part of the answer as to why we feel that 
governments should do more than ordinary individuals in response to 
certain emergencies. Simply put, I believe that the role of government is 
more demanding. 22 
Before saying anything more about governments, I want to further 
discuss the concept of a role. Roles in the relevant sense are 'social,' in 
that they are parts that agents may play in their relationships with others. 
Specifically, they are parts with distinctive social functions or purposes.23 
To play a role is to relate to (one or many) other persons through a 
relationship that imposes a configuration of normative expectations-
which may reflect duties, rights, powers and so forth-about how one 
should behave. These expectations are generally a function of the social 
purpose(s) of the role. In simpler terms, roles are ethics of how agents 
ought to relate to others in given social contexts. Roles single out role-
playing agents for the application of various reasons, permissions, and so 
on, which they emphasise, mould, and systematise. They simultaneously 
afford these agents with exclusionary reasons not to act for (some or all) 
conflicting reasons. Thus, some say that role-based ethics of action tend to 
prioritise themselves. Of course, the matter is often more complicated: 
agents tend to enter into a range of different relationships and play 
multiple roles concurrently. In an ideal world, such roles would not 
conflict, but in the real world, they often do. When that is the case, it is up 
to the conflicted role-player to choose which ethic of action to follow. As 
a rational and moral agent, the conflicted role-player should opt for a 
rationally undefeated and morally acceptable ethic of action (of which 
there might be more than one to choose from). But to add further 
complexity, what if none of the conflicting role-based ethics constitutes 
such an acceptable option? 
22 It does not matter in any significant way for the purpose of my argument whether the 
role of government is understood as a complex combination of different roles or a as a 
single role with highly demanding and complex dimensions. I tend to think that there is 
such a thing as the general role of government, but that a government qua agent may also 
assume more specific roles, for example, by entering into private contracts. More 
argument would be needed to establish this position, but I assume it here. 
23 See generally R.S. Downie Roles and Values: An Introduction to Social Ethics London, 
Methuen 1971, pp 121-128. 
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At this point, it is important to appreciate that agents qua agents-
not qua role-players-are the basic units to which reason and morality 
apply. To the extent that certain (or all) roles played by some agents 
require them to act immorally, agents should refrain from playing them. 
To the extent that some roles guide agents to act immorally, they are bad 
roles; their exclusion of conflicting reasons for action is unjustified. Some 
philosophers take the opposite stance and argue that role-playing 
undermines the very idea of a basic unity of agency. For example, 
Alasdair Macintyre maintains that role-playing disrupts the unity of an 
agent's moral life because 'we are taught to think and feel' in terms of the 
roles that we play, and not in terms of 'the unity of life' of the agent who 
plays those roles.24 According to him, our modem lives are partitioned 
'into a variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of 
behaviour,' which leads to a 'fragmentation of morality.' 25 However, 
morality is not something that can be evaded or selectively partitioned.26 It 
may be so partitioned from the point of view of a given role, but a role-
based normative assessment remains just that, an assessment from a point 
of view that may be defeated. Thus, roles do not shield agents either 
wholly or partially from the reach of morality. On the contra1y, to the 
extent that they are good (or justified) roles, they add considerations that 
agents should take into account when determining how to behave. Were 
Macintyre to tell the single mother who is also a firefighter, a homeowner, 
a committed friend, a soup kitchen volunteer, and her ailing mother's sole 
source of support that modernity has not taught her 'to think and feel' 
about the unity of her life, she might well reply that life itself has 
compelled her to learn how to manage its complexity. 
I will come back to the issue of immoral demands that roles 
sometimes make of role-bearers when focusing, below, on the pressures 
that some extreme emergencies may exert on the unified, non-
jurisdictional view of morality that I just asserted. For the moment, 
however, I want to underscore the fact that, as agents, governments and 
24 Alasdair Macintyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral The01y 3rd edn London, Duckworth 
2007, p 204. 
25 Macintyre (2007, p 204-205). 
26 For a specific defence of this claim elaborated in relation to roles: A.I. Applbaum 
Ethics.for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life Princeton, 
Princeton University Press 1999. 
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their representatives are also in the position of having to deal appropriately 
with the many additional demands of their roles. 
A liberal ethic of governance 
If we conceive of the relationship of state governance as imposing a 
general ethic of action on governments in their dealings with the governed, 
it makes sense to inquire into the compass of the legitimate 'role of 
government.' The main problem with following this path of inquiry like 
this one is that the compass of the said role is one of the most controversial 
issues of contemporary political philosophy. To the extent that they 
recognise the legitimacy of at least some forms of government, political 
traditions disagree vigorously about what the role ideally entails. At one 
end of the spectrum, some argue that governments should be no more than 
'night-watchmen', whose role is limited to the protection of the governed 
against force and fraud. At the other end, some stand for far-reaching 
governmental duties to meet the overall needs of the governed and shape, 
even improve, society and its members through (often quite invasive and 
micromanaged) intervention. I do not intend to resolve this deep-seated 
and multifaceted controversy here. 
Instead, I propose to build on the work of theorists whose middle-
ground position reflects the aspiration of many contemporary 
governments. I am referring to the liberal idea put forward by John Rawls 
and recently reinterpreted by Arthur Ripstein, according to which there 
ought to be a significant division of responsibility between governed and 
government. According to Ripstein's very general articulation of the 
claim, it is a government's 'responsibility to protect important liberties and 
opportunities, and also to set up and enforce important schemes of social 
cooperation that are prerequisite to an acceptable life for all. m The idea, 
grounded in an ideal conception of justice, is that certain types of 
individual misfortunes, obstacles, and needs should be held in common 
through the intercession of governments, and be treated as everyone's 
problem. However, once appropriate governmental institutions are in 
place, the governed are expected to take special responsibility for their 
own lives. Note here that, despite my personal sympathies for this kind of 
27 Arthur Ripstein 'Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal' Law and 
Philosophy 19 (2000) pp 751-779 at pp 756-758. 
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approach, I am appealing to it primarily because of its remarkable ability 
to expose impo1iant facets of the relationship between governments-as-
we-know-them and emergencies. To the extent that the reader reasonably 
believes that the legitimate role of government is somewhat wider or 
narrower, he or she should feel free to recast the insights presented here in 
terms of how he or she conceives the parameters of the role, mutatis 
mutandis. 
Inherently public emergencies 
The overarching point I want to make in the rest of this section and the 
ones that follow is that some emergencies may compel governments to 
play their role-or, perhaps more accurately, to discharge the social 
functions grounding their role-differently than usual.28 Referring to 
Rawls and Ripstein's idea of a significant division of responsibility 
between ordinary individuals and government, I identified the general 
parameters of the role of government as the protection of important 
liberties and opportunities, as well as the creation and enforcement of 
imp01iant schemes of social cooperation. One of the ways in which 
liberals tend to flesh out this position is by advocating a prominent role for 
governments in the provision of (economic) 'public goods.' Markets break 
down with respect to the provision of certain important goods (because of 
their 'indivisibility'29). All liberals accept that it is part of a government's 
general role to exercise its powers of regulation and taxation to provide 
these goods (or at least to ensure their provision through private means).30 
28 Depending on the level of generality at which the parameters of the role are defined, it 
might sometimes be even more accurate to say that a government has a different role to 
play in the face of an emergency. The argument in this section should be read with this 
slight caveat in mind. 
29 More precisely, a 'public good' is, on the economists' definition, a good that is both 
non-exclusionary (meaning that if the good is provided to anyone, no member of society 
can be excluded from benefiting from it) and non-rival in consumption (meaning that 
more than one individual can simultaneously benefit from the good without preventing 
others from also consuming the good). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz Economics 2nct 
edn New York, Norton 1997, p 157; John Rawls A TheOJJ' of Justice Revised edn Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 1999, s 42. 
30 See generally Samuel Freeman 'Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libe1iarianism is not a 
Liberal View' Phil and Public Affairs 30 (2002), pp 105-151 at pp 119-120; Limn 
Murphy and Thomas Nagel The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2002, pp 45-46. 
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Commonly mentioned public goods are national defence, police and fire 
protection, social order, public health and sanitation, highways, street 
lighting, ports and canals, water and sewer works, and education.31 
This idea provides a highly plausible explanation for why so many 
people felt that it was part of the government's role to ensure the proper 
maintenance of the levee system in New Orleans. Not only had the 
government openly undertaken to maintain the levees, thus creating 
expectations that it would do so properly, but the levee system was a 
public good. Of course, I do not wish to deny that governments qua agents 
may sometimes undertake to provide other kinds of services, and do so 
legitimately. I am saying, however, that an emergency that endangers the 
provision of goods that governments have a duty to ensure may intelligibly 
be labelled 'public. ' 32 As I suggested earlier, if we feel that governments 
have duties that exceed the mere demands of human solidarity in such 
emergencies, it is because some such duties are already inherent in the role 
31 Of course, the concept of public good is also invoked by other traditions of political 
thought. To the extent that these traditions understand the concept differently, the list of 
goods that governments must provide in order to fulfil their role may vary accordingly. 
32 Some may wonder why Sorell (2002, p 22) insists that public emergencies are 'usually 
the responsibility of public agencies and their officials'. One reason might be that, like 
me, Sorell considers that governments have a basic moral duty to provide at least some 
emergency assistance that does not flow from their governmental role, but from their 
unadorned status as moral agents. However, if this interpretation is accurate, I am not 
convinced that emergencies that fall outside the ambit of the role of government, and in 
relation to which governments have no duty to intervene qua governments, may 
intelligibly be understood as inherently public. Indeed, duties to provide emergency 
assistance in such cases may be shared by governments as well as a plethora of other 
moral agents. One possible explanation for Sorell's terminological choice is that 
governments are sometimes the only agents in a position to provide the needed assistance 
without making unacceptable sacrifices. When this is the case, governments may well be 
the only agents with a duty, or at least an undefeated duty, to act. Yet, pace Sorell, such 
emergencies may not be so much public emergencies as emergencies tout court. Another 
possibility is that Sorell considers that inherently public functions that governments 
delegate to private actors are, in a way, no more their own, yet, in another sense, they 
remain part of the compass of the general role of government. If this is what he means, 
his choice of terminology is rather imprecise. Finally, Sorell may be refen-ing to 
situations in which an emergency threatens a public good, but where there is no 
government in place to address it-consider the case of widespread violence in a failed 
state like Somalia. Although this interpretation is plausible and worth mentioning, I doubt 
that it is what Sorell had in mind, given his sustained emphasis on 'the state' elsewhere in 
his article. 
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governments should play. An emergency may require a government to go 
to greater lengths than usual and take extraordinary avenues to fulfill its 
role. Since emergencies often introduce forceful and conflicting reasons 
for action and may alter the moral landscape of a situation, a government 
may be under a duty to resort to different, sometimes much more radical 
or extraordinarily preventive, means to respond. 
Of course, a government that was failing to fulfill its role 
appropriately prior to a public emergency may attempt to invoke the 
emergency as an excuse for not discharging it or for resorting to 
unjustifiable, perhaps shockingly radical, means of discharging it. 33 At this 
point, however, I am setting aside governments that seek to evade their 
role, but on the implications of emergencies for those that strive to play 
their role legitimately. My point is that legitimate ethics of state 
governance pre-exist emergencies and determine their publicness. They 
determine which emergencies fall within the sphere of a government's 
responsibilities, and they give shape to its duties in relation to such 
emergencies. Although often neglected, this idea is not new. For example, 
it is partly on the basis of a similar insight that Michael Walzer frames his 
notorious 'supreme emergency' argument. He writes that: 
no government can put the life of the community itself and of all 
its members at risk, so long as there are actions available to it, even 
immoral actions, that would avoid or reduce the risk. It is for the 
sake of risk avoidance or risk reduction that governments are 
chosen. That is what political leaders are for; that is their first 
task.34 
Walzer's premises are contentious. Moreover, his general understanding 
of roles differs in important respects from the one I have defended above. I 
challenge Walzer on these issues below, but it is interesting to note here, 
in passing, the role-based structure of his approach. 
33 This kind of governmental behaviour and some typical fmms of abuse associated with 
it constitute one of Naomi Klein's main loci of criticism in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise 
of Disaster Capitalism London, Allen Lane 2007. 
34 Michael Walzer 'Emergency Ethics' in Arguing about War New Haven, Yale 
University Press 2004, pp 33-50 at p 42. 
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At last, we have what I think is a suitably articulated notion of 
'public emergency.' Of course, more needs to be said about such 
emergencies. Like all emergencies, public emergencies may vary in term 
of the nature, degree and extent of the harm they threaten, the risk of their 
occurrence, and their immediacy. Thus, questions about what 
governmental responses are justifiable necessarily extend beyond 
discussions of publicness. It is only when we take such distinctions of 
degree seriously that the full complexity of public emergencies comes to 
light. 
C. T AXONOMISING PUBLIC EMERGENCIES 
H.P. Lee begins his seminal study of emergency powers in Australia by 
remarking that, during the life of every state, there will arise occasions 
when peace and tranquility-which he assumes to constitute the normal 
state of affairs-may be disrupted by natural, economic, or violent 
emergencies. He adds that: 'Unless effectively contained such aberrant 
conditions will reach such a critical stage that a nation's constitutional and 
legal framework will be shattered. '35 By envisioning the kind of 
emergencies that cause political and legal institutions to be shaken to their 
core, Lee is guilty of a sin similar to Tom Sorell's: the sin of focusing on 
worst-case scenarios and neglecting important distinctions of degree. Lee 
goes even further down this path by explicitly assuming that there is an 
unavoidable slippery slope and that all public emergencies may lead to 
generalised disarray. Although such slides into social and institutional 
chaos are possible, I believe that we should resist the assumption that all 
public emergencies are of this sort. 
Some emergencies seriously endanger the well-being of the 
governed in ways that may affect the governmental provision of legitimate 
goods and services, but do not come even close to threatening to cause the 
collapse of the legal system or of entire governmental apparatuses. For 
example, isolated assaults or rape attempts often constitute emergencies 
that interfere with governmental efforts to protect the governed against 
crimes. Assuming that it is part of a government's legitimate role to 
provide such protection, I see no reason why these discrete individual 
35 H.P. Lee Emergency Powers Sydney, The Law Book Company Limited 1984, p 1. 
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emergencies may not also, pace Sorell and others, bear the label 'public. '36 
Typically, such isolated public emergencies do not pose any significant 
threat to governmental apparatuses. Moreover, they are unlikely to require 
governments to resort to any special means beyond ordinarily legitimate 
criminal law, criminal process, and law-enforcement mechanisms.37 
Consider also the case of more wide-scale emergencies, such as sudden 
floods, that constitute urgent threats to specific public goods such as 
public health and sanitation, transportation systems, and certain aspects of 
social order, e.g. associated waves oflooting. Experience shows that many 
such wide-scale emergencies pose no real threat of general governmental 
collapse. 
A possible difference is that, in the latter kind of situations, 
governments may be compelled to respond in unusual ways in order to 
fulfill their role. A government may need to involve particularly equipped 
and more efficient agencies such as the military and free up substantial 
funds. It may need to seize control of essential services that it normally 
relies on individuals or private corporations to provide. Otherwise 
effective schemes of social cooperation may need to be modified-
consider, at a general level, the possible need to bypass constitutionally-
entrenched federalism limits where they exist. Sometimes, a government 
may even need to limit the constitutionally-entrenched rights of 
individuals and groups. In such situations, the issue of moral justification 
ought to be at the forefront of a government's consideration when it 
designs its responses. Of course, it is also conceivable that special 
governmental responses may be needed to respond to isolated public 
emergencies, perhaps especially if the failure of ordinaiy means would 
lead to unconscionably widespread harm. Consider the possibility of grave 
acts of public sabotage that jeopardise essential government services, and 
thus indirectly threaten the population that relies on them. Here, as always, 
justifiability ought to guide a government's response. For example, it 
ought to keep in mind that the threshold for a justified (ordinary) criminal 
36 In fact, philosophers from a wide an-ay of political traditions conceive of crimes as 
'public wrongs.' E.g. R Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford, Blackwell Publishing 
1974, p 67; R.A. Duff and Sandra Marshall 'Sharing Wrongs' Canadian Joumal of Laiv 
and Jurisprudence 11 (1998) pp 7-22. 
37 Compare: Oren Gross 'Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always 
Be Constihltional?' Yale Law Journal 112 (2003) pp 1011-1130 at p 1087, who assumes 
that, by definition, public ' [ e ]mergencies call for extraordina1y governmental responses.' 
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law response is likely to be lower than for a justified resort to emergency 
powers that lack the same procedural and substantive safeguards. To 
paraphrase Sorell, what is in the balance clearly matters, at least up to a 
certain point. I add this last qualification to underline that the counter-
emergency means to which governments might resort may also be subject 
to moral limits that have very little, if anything, to do with what hangs in 
the balance. Some theorists speak, inter alia, of the prohibition against 
torture or against intentionally and deliberately killing the innocent in such 
terms. Others, like Bernard Williams, speak in more general terms of a 
'Basic Legitimation Demand' that governments not become 'part of the 
problem' by resorting to terror in their efforts to protect the governed from 
harm.38 
The temptation to overlook the issue of justification is especially 
strong in relation to emergencies that not only endanger the provision of 
specific public goods, but also the general provision of government (and, 
thus, of all services that governments may legitimately provide). Here 
again, there may be variations in terms of the degree and extent of harm 
threatened, the risk of its occurrence, its immediacy, and so forth. For 
example, a grave, though isolated, act of treason against a government 
may not present the same risks as a full-blown civil war. In other cases, 
the threat to governance may be confined to specific portions of a state-
think of active combat zones in a country like Sri Lanka. It may also affect 
the state in its entirety, or be international in scope. Nonetheless, general 
emergencies for political and legal institutions are those that tend to 
prompt theorists to start speaking of 'moral black holes' and governmental 
officials to start thinking about pressing the panic button. 39 I am one of 
38 Bernard Williams In the Beginning Was the DeedPrinceton, Princeton University Press 
2005, p 4. For a discussion of other important moral dimensions that straightforward 
balancing metaphors about security tend to obscure or disregard, see Jeremy Waldron 
'Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance' Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003) 
pp 191-210. 
39 On the basis of a careful historical survey, G.L. Negretto and J.A. Aguilar Rivera argue 
that: 
[T]he afte1math of independence in Latin America led to a protracted process of 
factional struggle, in which the legitimacy of newly established regimes was 
constantly challenged by warring elite. In this context, the use of exceptional 
measures was a permanent necessity. However, in the absence of adequate 
mechanisms, governments were usually forced to act beyond or against the 
2008) MAKING SENSE OF 'PuBLIC' EMERGENCIES 23 
those who believe that there are no such things as moral black holes and 
that morality applies to moral agents at all times and places (perhaps 
making some allowance for genuine doomsday scenarios). Yet as I have 
argued, this does not mean that the demands of morality are inflexible. In 
fact, they may very depending on the situation. One implication is that we 
should not dismiss without scrutiny claims that, with respect to 
emergencies threatening the 'the life of the nation, '40 'the framework of 
rights itself,'41 or 'the organised life of the community of which the state is 
composed, '42 morality permits, or even requires, governmental behaviour 
that would otherwise be unacceptable. 
Unfortunately, given the already significant breadth of this article, 
I cam10t afford to say much more about the justifiability of given 
governmental responses to given public emergencies. Instead, I want to 
focus on a commonly-encountered line of argument that permeates much 
of today's popular and theoretical discourse about the justifiability of 
governmental behaviour in times of severe public emergencies. I am 
referring to Michael Walzer's paradoxical contention that governments are 
sometimes permitted to sidestep absolute moral limits when confronted 
with 'supreme emergencies.' Much, I think, can be learned by scrutinising 
and questioning the premises of Walzer's in extremis reasoning. In 
particular, such scrutiny may rectify some familiar misconceptions about 
the moral position of governments in relation to public emergencies writ 
large, as well as about morality in general. 
constitution, hoping that they could later justify these measures, given the 
constraints of the situation. This was a dangerous expedient. 
G.L. Negretto and J.A. Aguilar Rivera 'Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin 
America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship' 
Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000) pp 1797-1823 at 1804. 
40 E.g. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (South Africa) s 
37(2). 
41 Alan Brudner 'Guilt Under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentaiy Supremacy' 
Criminal Law Quarterly 40 (1998) pp 287-325 at p 292. 
42 Lawless v Ireland (No 3) [ 1961] 1 EHRR 15 at p 31 (para 28) (European Court of 
Human Rights). 
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D. MORAL ABSOLUTES, ROLES, AND SUPREME (PUBLIC?) 
EMERGENCIES 
1. MORAL ABSOLUTES AND MICHAEL W ALZER'S SUPREME EMERGENCIES 
A very wide array of theorists believe that there are moral absolutes. By 
absolutes, I mean norms that are always valid and never overridable, 
justifiably infringed, or otherwise subject to exception. At a high level of 
generality, most familiar moral theories accept the existence of such 
absolutes. For example, deontologists tend to ground their theories in 
broad, universally-applicable absolutes such as the Golden Rule, the law 
of love, or 'categorical imperatives.' They also often expound entire 
systems of subordinate, more specific, absolute principles. Utilitarians, 
who are known for their pervasively contingent moral stances, also treat 
their basic injunction to act so as to produce the greatest good for the 
greatest number as absolute. Much the same is true of other f01ms of 
consequentialism. Even so-called moral particularists tend to acknowledge 
that there may be some moral absolutes, although at less abstract levels of 
thinking-i.e. absolutes on which morality and moral thought do not 
depend.43 Of course, debate about moral absolutes continues. However, 
the debate does not appear to focus so much on the possibility of moral 
absolutes, as on how many there are, and at what level of thinking, or 
specificity, they may exist. 
To the extent that one's stance on moral absolutes may affect one's 
stance on the flexibility of morality, it is also likely to affect one's stance 
on what may justifiably be done in the face of an emergency. Michael 
Walzer thinks that there are moral absolutes, and not only at the highest 
levels of generality. According to him, ordinary individuals must not 
intentionally kill the innocent, even in extreme situations. His stance is 
absolutist: 'A moral person will accept risk, will even accept death, rather 
than kill the innocent. '44 Yet there is a twist. Walzer believes that 
governments and their officials are in a different moral position insofar as 
they may be confronted with another possibly conflicting absolute. As I 
43 E.g. Jonathan Dancy 'Moral Particularism' in: E.N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition), online: 
<http ://p Jato .stanford. edu/archi ves/sum2005/ entries/moral-particularism/>. 
44 Walzer (2004, p 41). 
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noted earlier, he thinks that 'no government can put the life of the 
community itself and of all its members at risk, so long as there are actions 
available to it, even immoral actions, that would avoid or reduce the 
risk. '45 When governments cannot live up to this additional absolute 
without urgently violating the first-i.e. when there are no alternatives 
available and the two absolutes genuinely conflict-then, Walzer tells us, 
there is a 'supreme emergency.' 
Instead of speaking of 'supreme emergencies,' many theorists 
invoke the category of 'moral dilemma'-often qualified as 'tragic'-to 
characterise situations in which moral absolutes conflict irreconcilably. 
The dilemma is tragic, they say, when the conflicting absolutes are 
incommensurable, so that no matter how morally sensitive agents in the 
predicament may be, they are doomed to act immorally.46 The supreme-
emergency argument is of a different kind. Walzer does not claim that the 
two absolutes he defends are incommensurable. On the contrary, he claims 
that in a genuine supreme emergency, the prohibition on killing the 
innocent is 'devalued'47 in relation to the possibility of 'a far greater 
immorality. '48 The prohibition may be 'overridden, '49 in what would 
amount to a 'justified'50 response. Thus, whereas in the moral dilemma 
category there is no right answer to the problem, in supreme emergency 
scenarios, it is assumed that a government should choose the 'necessary' 
course of action over the rights of the innocent. 
Note that the nature of the 'should' m the last sentence is 
ambiguous. Is it moral? On the one hand, Walzer writes that, in a supreme 
emergency, 'the disaster that looms before us devalues morality itself and 
leaves us free to do whatever is military necessary to avoid the disaster, so 
45 Walzer (2004, p 42). 
46 E.g. John Gardner and Timothy Macklem 'Reasons' in: Jules Coleman and Scott 
Shapiro (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law pp 441-475 
Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002 at p 473; Bernard Williams 'Conflicts of Values' 
in: Moral Luck pp 71-82 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1981 at p 74; Thomas 
Nagel 'War and Massacre' in: Mortal Questions pp 53-74 Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1979. 
47 Walzer (2004, p 40). 
48 Walzer (2004, p 50). 
49 Walzer (2004, p 34). See also Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations New York, Basic Books 1977, p 259. 
50 Walzer (2004, p 54). 
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long as we don't produce an even worse disaster. ' 51 On the other hand, he 
claims that the doctrine of 'supreme emergency is a way of manoeuvring 
between two different and characteristically opposed understandings of 
morality.' 52 The first, he takes to reflect the 'absolutism of rights,' which 
fixes 'the everyday constraints on war-making (and on all adversarial 
engagements).'53 The other is utilitarianism, according to which 
'innocence is only one value that must be weighed against others in the 
pursuit of the greatest good of the greatest number. ' 54 Although normally 
limited by absolute rights, utilitarianism 'reimposes itself' in extremis for 
governmental agents.55 Thus, Walzer does not think that there are moral 
black holes or that one may ever disregard morality as a whole.56 It seems 
best to understand him as speaking of two sets of moral considerations that 
are, if not completely incommensurable, in extreme tension with each 
other in times of supreme emergency. 
2. CHALLENGING W ALZER'S ACCOUNT 
Disputing the centrality of governments 
One may challenge Walzer's moral calculus from a variety of angles, two 
of which I want to discuss. My first point is structural. What, if anything, 
makes governments justified in infringing considerations that are 
unqualifiedly absolute for other agents? What makes them so special? At 
various points in his work, Walzer flirts with the idea of representation. 
Recall, for example, the passage reproduced earlier, in which he argues 
that governments may be justified in protecting the life of the community 
through immoral actions at least partly because they 'are chosen.' This 
strand of argument in Walzer's work is far from seamless. If 
representation is such a decisive factor, one may ask, why are 
revolutionary or dissenting groups with plausible claims to represent their 
51 Walzer (2004, p 40) [Emphasis added]. 
52 Walzer (2004, p 35). 
53 Walzer (2004, p 35, 39). 
54 Walzer (2004, p 35). 
55 Walzer (2004, p 40, 50). 
56 Note further that Walzer thinks that a justifiable governmental response to a supreme 
emergency must be proportionate in addition to being necessary. The threat must also be 
imminent. See Walzer (1977, p 231). 
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political community in the same moral position? Walzer seems to concede 
the point, at least partially, when he recognises that non-state terrorist 
groups responding to threats genocidal in character may be able to invoke 
a supreme emergency to justify extreme measures.57 
One may press the point even further and ask why representation 
should be a decisive factor at all. Walzer speaks of a governmental 
contract through which the governed cede some of their rights and powers 
to their (representative) government. Yet he concurrently concedes that 
'individuals have no right to save themselves by killing the innocent' that 
they could transfer to governments in anticipation of supreme 
emergencies. 58 Thus it is unclear what role he understands representation 
to play in his argument for dissociating governments from some of the 
most important demands of ordinary morality. To be sure, Walzer argues 
that the role of representation has to be understood in tandem with a claim 
about the value of community. Governmental representation, he claims, is 
not merely representation of individuals. It is representation of individuals 
and of the political community. Walzer argues that the value of the 
political community is not reducible to the sum of its parts, and thus that 
it adds something to the representation equation (and to the prerogatives of 
the representative government). Notice, however, that by making this 
move, Walzer shifts the emphasis of his argument away from 
representation towards an appreciation of the value of what is represented. 
Given the case that he is attempting to build, this move is perhaps 
unavoidable. As C.A.J. Coady remarks, 'representation, by itself, does not 
do much to alter one's moral status: it extends one's powers and 
capacities, though it also restricts them in various ways, but the question 
of moral limits and freedoms will be largely a matter for ordinary moral 
assessment of the institutional purposes for which these powers have been 
created.59 In other words, it is the purpose and value of governmental 
action, more than any independent fact about representation, that is the 
linchpin of Walzer' s argument. 
57 Walzer (2004, p 54). 
58 Walzer (2004, p 42). 
59 C.A.J. Coady 'Politics and the Problem of Dirty Hands' in Peter Singer (ed) A 
Companion to Ethics pp 373-383 Oxford, Blackwell 1993 at p 377. 
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In a way, then, we are back to the question of the moral position of 
governments in relation to their role in society, asking what they may 
justifiably do to secure public goods. To fully grasp the ramifications of 
Walzer's argument in this regard, it is crucial to appreciate the following 
point. Even if one accepts, as I did earlier, that something like 'national 
defence' is a public good that governments ought to provide, it does not 
necessarily follow that governments may ever justifiably commit 
immoralities in the process. In the context of his discussion of supreme 
emergencies, Walzer seeks to bridge this gap by assigning an overriding 
moral importance to 'the life of the community.' I shall discuss this 
argument at greater length in the next section. For now, notice only that if 
the life of the community really has the supreme moral importance that 
Walzer ascribes to it-not only for governments who represent it, but for 
all of us who are part of it-then it is puzzling why he does not recognise 
that, in extremis, any agent who is in a position to defend it effectively 
may be justified in doing so. In fact, his method of constructing 
asymmetry in this regard seems slightly disingenuous. Individuals, he 
says, must uphold the rights of innocents even in life-threatening situations 
of self-defence.60 Governments must also uphold these rights, but may be 
justified in overriding them when necessary to defend the life of the 
community. Is it really so inconceivable that ordinary individuals could 
ever be in a position to safeguard the life of the community by having to 
kill innocents? I will spare the reader the many colourful scenarios that 
could apply. To be fair, Walzer sometimes claims that the types of 
dilemmas exemplified by supreme emergencies-which he generically 
terms 'dirty hands' dilemmas61-do not only confront governments and 
their officials. 'No doubt,' he writes, 'we can get our hands dirty in private 
life also, and sometimes, no doubt, we should. '62 That is to say, we all may 
sometimes, and even sometimes should, do 'the right thing [ ... ] in 
utilitarian terms' even if acting in this way would leave us 'guilty of a 
60 See Walzer (2004, p 41). At one point, Walzer even speaks of'the supreme emergency 
ofself-defense.' Walzer (1977, p 254). This way of using of the expression is out of line 
with his more general use, as I explained it earlier. 
61 Walzer (2004, p 46) argues that one of 'the effect[s] of the supreme-emergency 
argument' is 'to provide an account of when it is permissible (or necessary) to get our 
hands ditiy' (in the sense explained in the text). 
62 Michael Walzer 'Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands' Philosophy and Public 
4ffairs2(l973)pp 160-180atp 174. 
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moral wrong' in absolutist terms.63 Yet Walzer argues that governments 
are significantly more likely to face 'dirty hands' scenarios. He also seems 
to think that only governments-qua institutional role-bound 'structures 
for organising collective action'-may appropriately dirty their hands 
when the situation is one of 'supreme emergency.' 
In light of my earlier discussion of the place of roles in moral 
thinking, this last claim is puzzling. If Walzer really thinks that it is always 
morally wrong to violate the right of innocents not to be killed 
intentionally, and if a given ethic of governance sometimes requires such 
action, then it is a bad ethic, at least to the extent of the required 
immorality. When using the terminology of justification or permission, 
which merely implies the perpetration of a prima facie moral wrong or of 
no wrong at all, Walzer avoids this criticism. However, he also regularly 
departs from this language in favour of a more uncompromising approach. 
For example, he speaks of violations of the (absolute) rights of the 
i1mocent in supreme emergencies as 'great immoralities.'64 He even seems 
to acknowledge the instability of his conception of the role of government 
when he writes that we, as moral agents, may 'have a right to avoid, if we 
possibly can, those [governmental and other] positions in which we might 
be forced to do terrible things. '65 When one appreciates that whatever a 
government does is done by individuals acting on its behalf, and that these 
individuals may well be not absolved of individual responsibility simply 
because they act on behalf of the government, the discomfort underlying 
this concession becomes unambiguous. Notice, however, that this specific 
tension dissolves if we posit that, given the importance of political 
communities, it is not only governments but all of us who are absolutely 
prohibited from putting the life of the community and those of its 
members at risk so long as there are actions available to us that would 
avoid or reduce the risk. Then, alleged paths of escape from absolutes into 
role-based hiding places fade away, and the tragic sense of the dilemma 
takes its starkest form. 66 Of course, one may argue that Walzer supposes 
63 Walzer (1973, p 161). 
64 Walzer (2004, p 50). 
65 Walzer (1973, p 165). 
66 This way of thinking appears to permeate the work of Henry Shue, another supreme 
emergency theorist. Shue speaks of 'we' and 'one' as having to contend with supreme 
emergency predicaments, but does not clarify the matter any further. See Hemy Shue 
'The Impossibility of Justifying Weapons of Mass Destrnction' in: S.H. Hashmi and S.P. 
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that ought implies can and that only governmental agencies and their 
representatives are in a position to defend the community in situations of 
supreme emergency. However, even if this observation were to hold true 
most of the time, it would remain a contingent truth. The deeper question 
is whether an agent-individual or governmental-whose intervention 
would be effective and necessary to defend the life of the community may, 
or even must, intervene, despite having to violate the rights of the innocent 
in the process. Here, either Walzer is a 'rights absolutist' or he is not. 
Those who think that he is (or should be) tend not to speak of supreme 
emergencies as providing all-things-considered justifications. Instead, they 
invoke the language of excuses, which does not deny wrongdoing in any 
way. 
This last, often implicit, asse1iion does not end the debate. Indeed, 
isn't morality more lenient at the level of excuses towards governments 
facing supreme emergencies? Some argue that it is, emphasising that the 
power of judging and acting in such situations, like in so many other 
significant public emergencies, is a 'hot potato' that people are often more 
than happy to surrender to governments. Thus, the argument goes, if 
governments 'do their best to cope in a situation that probably no one else 
would handle better,' shouldn't that be good enough? Should we not 
expect morality to be more charitable towards them in such 
circumstances?67 Of course, the fact that an agent is dealing with an 
emergency, perhaps especially an unforeseeable one, that requires quick 
unplanned action may affect the standard of behaviour to which this agent 
should be held. However, the validity of this point extends to all agents, 
not only governments. The argument that governments would probably do 
a better job of responding to some emergencies obviously makes the 
matter more specific, but is it really a sufficient reason for being more 
lenient towards them? Consider the following example. Police officers are 
often in a better position than us to deal with various types of violent 
emergencies, and are often more likely to be successful in addressing 
them. They are trained for such situations, they are better equipped, they 
tend to be more readily obeyed, and so forth. Arguably, however, even 
when acting under emergency-related pressures, police officers should be 
Lee (eds) Ethics and Weapons of lvlass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives 
pp 139-162 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004 at pp 146, 154. 
67 This is the position advocated by Sorell (2002, p 34). Compare: Shue (2004). 
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held to higher standards of reasonableness-of composure, care, 
accuracy-than the rest of us. They should certainly not be held to lower 
standards. We expect them to be at least equally, if not more, level-headed 
than other individuals, and we conceive of any higher demands placed on 
them as functions of the role they assume. I believe that the same is true of 
governments in general with respect to an even wider array of 
emergencies, including the supreme. With greater resources, information, 
authority, as well as opportunities for contingency planning and training 
come greater responsibilities and greater expectations of virtue and 
reasonableness. 68 Throughout history, many governments have clearly 
failed to live up to such expectations in times of emergency and, as a 
result, may not deserve of our charity or leniency. On the contrary, many 
of them may warrant outright moral censure. 
Human communities and the moral world 
In more ways than one, the confinement of the logic of supreme 
emergencies to governments is unstable. Yet, even if we deny that it 
should be so confined, supreme emergencies may still be conceivable. The 
more common challenge to Walzer's calculus questions its very premises. 
As one author has recently observed, 'the prohibition on intentionally 
killing innocent people functions in our moral thinking as a sort of 
touchstone of moral and intellectual health. ' 69 It is not the aspect of 
Walzer's thinking that I wish to question here. Instead, I want to focus on 
the other side of the dilemma: the allegedly supreme, overriding 
imp01iance that Walzer attaches to 'the life of the community.' Much has 
already been written on this point, so I shall focus on aspects relevant to 
my wider argument. 
Emphasising the importance of 'the political community,' Walzer 
writes that: 
68 Some theorists even take the further step---perhaps one too many~of claiming that 
excuses are simply not available to governments, owing to the nature of their agency and 
the nature of their role. See e.g. Andrew P. Simester 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of 
Law' in: Victor V. Ramraj ( ed) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality pp 289-313 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008 at pp. 300-302. 
69 C.A.J. Coady Morality and Political Violence Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2008 p 297. Of course, innocence is a notoriously contested concept that bears different 
meanings for different writers, but I now wish to bracket this line of inquiry. 
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When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial 
extension or governmental structure or prestige or honor, but in 
what we might think of as its ongoingness, then we face a loss that 
is greater than we can imagine, except for the destruction of 
humanity itself. We face moral as well as physical extinction, the 
end of a way of life as well as of a set of particular lives, the 
disappearance of people like us.70 
Of course, the bare mention of 'our community' is too thin. The 
disintegration of a political community living according to fascist ideals 
would be no great loss. However, assuming an acceptably thicker account, 
the importance of communal ties is apparent. Communities tend to be 
valuable as shared repositories of language, values, and practices that 
enable and inform many of the substantive goods that compose our lives 
as individual human beings. They also provide ongoing historical 
narratives within which we are able to locate our lives and give them 
meaning. However, it is not sufficient to point to the undoubted value of 
'the political community.' In a day and age in which our political 
affiliations are increasingly plural and multi-layered as a result of mass 
migration, globalisation, and communications, one may wonder to which 
political communities Walzer is referring. Interestingly, he avoids 
focusing explicitly on the emblematic political community that is 'the 
nation.' One reason for this evasion may be that, historically speaking, 
'most nations have always been culturally diverse, problematic, protean 
and artificial constructs that take shape very quickly and come apart just as 
fast. ' 71 Instead, Walzer seems to privilege state communities-but does 
not defend his choice. At one point, he even acknowledges that 'the state 
is nothing more than [ ... ] a particular structure for organizing collective 
action that can always be replaced by some other structure.'72 Perhaps 
even more noteworthy, Walzer seems to discount the possibility that, in 
some societies and for some people, forms of communal ties that are not 
usually conceived as political are as, if not more, important-e.g. family 
70 Walzer (2004, p 43). 
71 Linda Colley quoted in Thomas M. Franck 'Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and 
Community in Law and Practice' American Journal of International Law 96 (1990) pp 
359-383 at p 365. 
72 Walzer (2004, p 49). 
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relationships, friendships, religious and professional affiliations. Thus, the 
elevation of 'the political community' to a supreme status is problematic. 
Many of the deep tensions permeating Walzer' s argument seem to 
come from this misplaced emphasis. Communities do play a fundamental 
role in our lives. We are social animals, and we would not be who we are 
without our communities. However, individual human beings are, and 
ought to be considered, the supreme loci of value, or as some might say, 
the ultimate moral units. Walzer's talk of communities as having some 
sort of 'transcendence' and 'different and larger prerogatives' sits 
awkwardly with this proposition.73 In consistence with the humanistic 
principle that I endorsed earlier, communities matter not in themselves but 
to their individual members, whose shared way of life they embody and 
inform. Their value does not transcend the value of human life. Thus, an 
emergency that endangers a political community's institutions and its way 
of life, but does not threaten innocent human lives-e.g. a war waged in 
accordance with the jus in hello-could hardly be said to threaten what is 
of supreme moral importance. Admittedly, there may be more intricate 
situations in which there is a threat of both moral and physical extinction, 
endangering 'the end of a way of life as well as of a set of particular lives.' 
Some commentators claim that in such a situation, we need to decide 
between two versions of the humanistic premise: '(1) treat every person as 
having ultimate moral value and (2) never treat any person only as a 
means.'
74 They add that, in some interpretations, an emergency response 
that takes the life of some innocents to save a much larger number from, 
say, genocide might satisfy (1) while violating (2). Yet, they also often 
remark, correctly in my view, that this kind of distinction is 'disturbingly 
difficult to see' and that such situations are extremely rare, if not 'factually 
implausible.' Others take a firmer stance and resist drawing any 
correlation between the category of supreme emergency and a notion as 
fluid as political community. Instead, they tend to reject Walzer's category 
entirely. 75 
73 Walzer (1977, p 254). 
74 Shue (2004, p 151) holds this view most explicitly, but he is not alone in assuming it. 
75 E.g. G.E.M. Anscombe 'Modern Moral Philosophy' Philosophy 33 (1958) pp 1-19 at p 
17; Coady (2008, pp 299-300). 
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Should we dispense with the category altogether? If we shift the 
emphasis away from threats to communities to threats to the sheer 
possibility of human life, some scenarios that are harder to discount 
emerge. Consider emergencies that threaten the very possibility ofhuman-
life-as-we-know-it. Think, for example, of a global nuclear war, which 
might yield a world in which the survivors lapse into a bestial condition in 
order to survive in an environment in which nothing usually deemed 
necessary for human flourishing remains. This type of emergency, I take 
it, is what Henry Shue calls 'supreme moral emergency' or what David 
Wiggins calls a 'dire emergency.' In Shue's words, the category 
encompasses emergencies that endanger 'the moral fabric of the life of at 
least a large portion of humanity.' They are emergencies that represent a 
'threat to principled social life in general' characterised by 'the 
unprincipled exertion of sheer force.' 76 In Wiggins's words, they are 
emergencies which, under a stem enough interpretation, jeopardise the 
survival of 'human civilization' or 'the very conditions under which 
ethical choice itself is possible. '77 They are emergencies that even 
deontological theorists who ground their rigidly absolutist positions in 
non-consequentialist, highly-general foundational principles, would need 
to acknowledge as undermining of absolutism. 78 These are the 
emergencies that may render intelligible Walzer's paradoxical idea that 
some emergencies can make 'great immoralities morally possible.'79 
Indeed these are emergencies that are, as it were, ultimate. In a passage 
antecedent to any arguments about communities, Walzer himself seems to 
recognise the unique, even foundational, nature of such hypothetical 
moments: 'How can we, with our principles and prohibitions, stand by and 
watch the destruction of the moral world in which those principles and 
76 Shue (2004, pp 148-150). 
77 D Wiggins Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality London, Penguin 
Books 2006 pp 258-259. 
78 Some are very reluctant to do so. E.g. Alan Gewirth 'Are There Any Absolute Rights' 
in: Jeremy Waldron (ed) Theories of Rights pp 91-109 Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1984. 
79 Walzer (2004, p 50). Walzer's terminology is ill-chosen. Ifl say that it is 'ntelligible, it 
is more as a figure of speech than literally. Like Wiggins (2006, p 259) remarks, in such 
dire predicaments, 'there will be no question of the agent's emerging from the terrible 
sihiations in which he has had to take part with the claim that he did the morally good act 
or the act that it was simply right to do. The whole question of the string "permissibility" 
and "impennissibility" of various acts, already miles away, is far out of sight.' 
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prohibitions have their hold?' 80 One can ve1y well make sense of this 
contention without invoking political communities in any way. 
Note that, by threatening to undermine the efficacy and 
justifiability of norms in such a radical way, supreme moral emergencies 
also unavoidably imperil the possibility of the ideal of the rule of law-
and even of law tout court-to the point that it may not be very relevant to 
speak of the possibility of a legal response. In fact, it seems to me that the 
dangers of abuse and mistake associated with a category as earth-
shattering as 'supreme moral emergency' would be so great that 
governments should not even attempt to account for it pre-emptively. Of 
course, such emergencies are conceivable. The point is that they are the 
rarest of the rare, the unlikely exception to the exception, and that it is 
clearly inadvisable to take them as paradigms for the study and 
systematisation of the relationship between emergencies, morality, and 
appropriate governmental responses. 81 In all other cases, governments 
should strive to respond to emergencies in fully justified ways and, to the 
extent that there are any moral absolutes, respect them while so doing. 
E. ONE LAST PROVOCATION: PUBLICLY DECLARED 
EMERGENCIES 
By way of conclusion to this aiiicle, I deem it important to say a few 
things about one last and disturbingly widespread way of thinking about 
public emergencies. Although the leap back to more conceptual 
considerations might seem abrupt to the reader, a discussion of public 
emergencies would not be complete without noting the existence of this 
different conception and exposing it. 
Emergencies, some believe, are 'public' when they are declared or 
proclaimed to be so by governments. This view takes various shapes. At 
one extreme, some argue that public emergencies are inevitably 
constituted, or created, by governmental declarations since, in the words of 
80 Walzer (2004, p 37). 
81 Compare: Oren Gross 'The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law' in: 
Sanford Levinson (ed) Torture: A Collection pp 229-253 Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2004 at pp 236-239; Gross (2003, p 1134). 
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Giorgio Agamben, 'the only circumstances that are necessary and 
objective are those that are declared to be so. ' 82 Although it is undeniable 
that governments may at times generate some worrisome emergencies by 
acting abusively and creating unjustified threats of harm, it is simply 
wrong (and an open-door to abuse) to think that the existence of a public 
emergency ultimately comes down to a governmental declaration of any 
sort. Emergencies are situations in which there is a risk of serious harm 
and an urgent response is needed to avert or minimise that harm. As such, 
they often exist (or not) independently of anything that governments say 
and do about them. 
That being said, it is also a mistake to think that a governmental 
declaration of emergency is 'just that, a claim, inserted into the regular 
operation of political life. ' 83 The truth, I think, lies somewhere in the 
middle. Whereas a governmental declaration of emergency is not 
constitutive of a public emergency, it is neither just another governmental 
claim. Typically, a governmental declaration of emergency is meant to be 
performative. It is a distinct speech-act by which a government brings into 
existence a different normative order, often known as a 'state of 
emergency.' 84 The alleged substantive basis for declaring such a state of 
emergency is usually that the legal order in which the government 
normally operates does not allow it to address one or more public 
emergencies as necessary. However, there is an important distinction 
between the substantive basis of the declaration and the formal act of its 
utterance. On the one hand, a government's decision to declare and 
implement a state of emergency may be criticised in substantive terms. For 
example, given the nature of the emergency, the government may already 
be in a position to address it appropriately within the parameters of the 
existing legal order. Likewise, when extraordinary measures are necessary, 
the ones introduced may be too far-reaching. Criticisms of this type are 
substantive or content-dependent; they involve an assessment that is 
82 Giorgio Agamben State of Exception Chicago, University of Chicago Press 2005 p 30. 
83 Mark Tushnet 'The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Conceptual 
Issues' in: Victor V. Ramraj ( ed) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality pp 145-155 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008 at p 148. 
84 For the sake of simplicity, I use the notion of 'state of emergency' generically. Other 
expressions are sometimes used to convey that a state of emergency has been imposed, 
including 'martial law,' 'state of siege,' 'state of defence,' 'state of exception,' 'state of 
alert,' 'extraordinary powers,' 'emergency derogations,' and 'emergency powers.' 
2008] MAKING SENSE OF 'PuBuc' EMERGENCIES 37 
dependent on the actual characteristics of the related emergencies. On the 
other hand, governments' responses to public emergencies may also, on 
occasion, be criticised for content-independent reasons, such as a failure to 
declare, or declare properly, the establishment of a state of emergency. In 
order to make sense of any governmental emergency response and assess 
its justifiability, one first needs to know whether there is a genuine 
emergency, and know something about its characteristics. One may then 
ask whether the response is reasonably tailored to the emergency. To what 
extent is the response necessary? Is it proportionate? However, when the 
emergency response specifically involves a significant departure from an 
existing legal order, many theorists and lawmakers think that it must also 
be formally declared. 
Legal instruments that explicitly recognise the possibility of states 
of emergency almost always require that they be formally and publicly 
declared (in addition to requiring that they meet various substantive 
conditions). This generalisation applies as much to state constitutions and 
legislation as to international treaties.85 There are often variations in terms 
of who may make the declaration, how, with whose approval, for how 
long, and to which effect, but the basic requirement is almost omnipresent. 
Interestingly, in the case of legal instruments that explicitly recognise the 
possibility of states of emergency but do not require a formal declaration, 
judicial bodies have sometimes been known to read in the requirement. 
For example in the case of Cyprus v Turkey, the European Commission of 
Human Rights held that, although the European Convention did not 
explicitly demand that emergency derogations be officially declared, 
'article 15 requires some formal and public act of derogation, such as a 
declaration of martial law or state of emergency, and that, where no such 
85 Consider the following examples selected somewhat unsystematically from a vast array 
of equally-revealing constitutional, legislative, and international law examples: 
Constitution of India 1950 art 352(1 ); Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1996 (South Africa) s 37(1); Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
(Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated 
for implementation by the Proclamation of the National People's Congress on December 
4, 1982) art 80; Loi n°55-385 du 3 avril 1955 (France) Article 1; Emergencies Act 1988 
(Canada) ss 6(1), 17(1), 28(1), and 38(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 
(ICCPR) art 4(1 ). 
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act has been proclaimed[ ... ] art. 15 cannot apply.' 86 Such insistence on the 
importance of declarations once again begs the question. If formal 
declarations are so critical when governments decide to bring about states 
of emergency in response to actual emergencies, don't we have here a 
distinct mark of 'the public'? It is certainly true that, as it is understood by 
theorists and lawmakers, the declaration requirement applies to 
governments who face emergencies and not to ordinary individuals. In that 
sense, it is a distinctively public requirement. However, it is also true that 
governments can often address public emergencies-i.e. emergencies that 
affect the provision of public goods-within the parameters of the 
ordinary legal order, without having to declare and implement any special 
state of emergency or emergency derogations. Thus, the declaration 
requirement marks a distinct sub-group of public emergencies. The real 
underlying question is why such a sub-group should be singled out and 
subjected to special formalities. 
The general wisdom is that a government must make a special 
declaration when, in response to an alleged emergency, it seeks to do what 
would be illegal in ordinary times. In such situations, as Oren Gross and 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain remark, an 'open acknowledgement and engagement 
in public justificatory exercise is a critical component in the moral and 
legal choices made by the officials. ' 87 Why is such a move critical in such 
situations? Here, it is useful to come back to the idea of ethics of 
governance, focusing this time around on the rule of law, which one 
author recently described as the 'ethic of civility[ ... ] appropriate for public 
life. '88 The rule of law is both an ethic of governmental accountability and 
an ethic of autonomy. On the one hand, it insists that governments, like 
everybody else, must comply with the law of the land and be publicly 
accountable for their behaviour in the courts. On the other, it imposes a 
series of formal conditions on the law-e.g. clarity, prospectivity, 
openness, stability, consistency, generality-that are meant to ensure that 
its addressees are capable of being guided by it, and thus that they are able 
to conduct their lives around it and avoid the stigma and disruption of the 
86 Cyprus v Turkey [1979] 4 EHRR 556, Part III (European Commission of Human 
Rights). 
87 Gross and Ni Aolain (2006, p 140). 
88 Christine Sypnowich 'Utopia and the Rule of Law' in: David Dyzenhaus (ed) 
Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order pp 178-195 Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2000 at p 194. 
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adverse normative consequences that may follow from its breach. When, 
in the face of a public emergency, a government needs to introduce a swift 
state of emergency that alters its own normative position as well as that of 
the governed, it puts its commitment to accountability and fair notice 
under pressure-if it does not outright seek to depart from or suspend the 
rule of law. Of course, the rule of law is no absolute, and partial departures 
or temporary suspensions may sometimes be justified in the name of other 
more pressing values. However, even in extremis, such departures require 
governments to, at the very least (and keeping in mind substantive 
conditions such as Williams's Basic Legitimation Demand), formally 
notify those whose life might suddenly be affected by extraordinary 
measures, as well as those who should hold such measures in check. 
This rule of law constraint stems from the fact that governments 
tend to have the ability to modify normative positions in all-encompassing 
ways and alter what rights, duties, powers, permissions, or other 
constraints apply to whom and in what circumstances. In other words, the 
declaration requirement is a function of governments' practical authority. 
The basic assumption is that, as moral agents, governments should strive 
to exercise their authority justifiably and that, in the case of the 
establishment of states of emergency or other abrupt normative shifts such 
as wars, a formal declaration is a precondition for justifiability. The 
governed and all relevant organs of government must be aware of the 
disruption in a way that creates a formal disincentive to abuse and, 
ultimately, stands in the way of a reign of terror. Note here that the fact 
that an emergency is public and falls within a government's sphere of 
responsibilities generally implies, except perhaps in some cases of private 
delegation, that the government bears the burden of justifying any prima 
fade wrongs and illegalities perpetrated in the process of addressing it. 
However, it is only when the governmental response includes an exercise 
of authority that results in abrupt and ordinarily illegal normative changes 
that a special declaration must be made. The deeper assumption seems to 
be that, in other cases, fuller confonnity with the rule of law ensures at 
least basic accountability and formally satisfact01y guidance. 
At this point, I am aware that many questions remain unanswered. 
For example, to what extent should the declaration and implementation of 
a state of emergency be made according to law? How specific should a 
formal declaration of emergency be? To what extent, if at all, should it be 
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subject to legislative scrutiny, and perhaps most importantly, review by 
courts? Given the very real possibility of governmental abuse, how 
resolutely should governmental emergency responses come under legal 
control and seek to live up to the wider desiderata of the rule of law? 
These important questions all belong to a more specific study of the 
relationship between public emergencies and the ideal of rule of law, and 
are at the centre of a vibrant contemporary debate.89 I shall say no more 
about them here. Note, however, that the issues on which I focused in this 
article are antecedent to this and other debates related to the management 
of public emergencies. By clarifying key dimensions of their subject-
matter, I hope to have made a valuable, if only embryonic, contribution to 
their informed resolution. 
Of course, one might object that my analysis of public emergencies 
in this article is not 'antecedent' enough to these further debates, given 
that it focuses on governments and that public goods-and thus public 
emergencies-may exist even in the absence of government. However, 
one should not exaggerate the importance of this last objection. Like 
Bernard Williams once noted, 'the securing of order, protection, safety, 
trust, and the conditions of cooperation' is one of the primary issues-if 
not the primary issue-of political theory and the modem state presents 
itself as a solution to it, as well as to the securing of many other public 
goods.90 In fact, at this historical juncture, state governance remains the 
main purported answer to the provision of public goods, even though state 
governments' authority and claims to comprehensiveness are increasingly 
being eroded. Hence, my decision to focus primarily on state governance. 
Notice, however, that this choice of emphasis does not preclude that other 
entities-be they local tribes or the international community-may also 
have distinctive duties to answer emergency threats to public goods when 
a given state's government fails to do it or is simply inexistent.91 That said, 
a discussion of these sub-state and supra-state emergency dynamics will 
have to await another day. 
89 See e.g. the challenging essays collected in Victor V. Ramraj (ed) Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008. 
90 Williams (2005, pp 3-9) 
91 Compare: Leslie Green 'The Duty to Govern' Legal Themy 13 (2007) pp 165-185. 
